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This article presents a unifying interpretation of Rawls’s major works. The 
interpretation emphasizes the parallels in Rawls’s theories of justice and legitimacy 
for domestic and global institutions. 
 
 
Of the many criticisms of Rawls’s work, among the sharpest have been those 
charging inconsistency. Rawls’s later work has been accused of contradicting nearly 
everything that made his earlier work important.  
Rawls’s second book, Political Liberalism, attracted a great deal of censure on 
this score.1 Many worried that Rawls’s new-found concerns with stability and consensus 
had resulted, in the words of one critic, in “a slighting of economic justice and the plight 
of the worst-off, which was central in Theory of Justice.”2 The difference principle, it was 
feared, had been “sacrificed,”3 or at least “drowned out.”4 Bruce Ackerman complained 
that, “The egalitarian commitment of A Theory of Justice does not survive the movement 
to Political Liberalism…. Rawls is wrong, then, to suppose that his new commitment to 
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political liberalism is compatible with his older commitments to the original position and 
equality.”5  
Other critics charged that the “radical change”6 of turning justice as fairness into a 
political conception limited its relevance by making the theory applicable only to 
societies that were already liberal. This “parochialism” struck some as “disappointing”7; 
others found Rawls’s critics accusing him of “morally criticizable backsliding”8; and at 
least one author claimed that Rawls “appears to have jettisoned the project of justifying 
liberalism”9 altogether. Brian Barry, reflecting on this “bad book by a famous author,”10 
remarked that “since there is a widespread feeling that Political Liberalism does not 
succeed in fulfilling its stated task, the conclusion is naturally drawn that the whole 
Rawlsian project is fatally flawed.”11 Perry Anderson’s verdict was that, “Rawls’s new 
book is thus not a development of his earlier work: it is an amputation of it. The burden 
of Political Liberalism is an intellectual renunciation, rather than any substantive 
addition.”12 
Rawls’s third book was then charged with double betrayal. The Law of Peoples 
was accused of undermining both Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. Some 
critics objected that Rawls’s idea of a people was neither “clear enough” nor “significant 
enough in the human world”13 to displace the focus on persons in justice as fairness. 
Some were perplexed that the highly progressive principles of Theory of Justice were 
replaced in the international realm by “timid”14 principles from a “vanished Westphalian 
world.”15 Others complained that Rawls’s willingness to tolerate illiberal societies was 
not only “a betrayal of liberalism,”16 but also “blatantly inconsistent”17 with his treatment 
of illiberal minorities in Political Liberalism.  
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In sum, Rawls’s critics have charged “philosophical incoherence.”18 Whatever the 
value of Rawls’s particular arguments, the sense among many theorists is that these 
arguments do not fit together. Rawls’s later additions have dragged down the original 
structure, and the best that Rawlsians can hope for is that something could be built with 
the wreckage.  
This short article attempts to respond to these criticisms by laying out a 
systematic interpretation of Rawls’s work as a whole. Rawls’s work can indeed be seen 
to present a unified theory, whose power comes from the mutual support of its parts. 
Elsewhere I have drawn on this unifying interpretation to explain why Rawls went the 
way he did at particular points — for example, why he framed his global theory in terms 
of peoples instead of persons, and why he rejected an international difference principle.19 
In this article, I survey the entirety of the Rawlsian theoretical architecture, attempting to 
show how the major structural concepts in Rawls’s works fit together. The challenge 
taken up here is, essentially, to “use all of these Rawlsian words in one sentence.” The 
interpretation will be successful if the reader agrees that this “sentence” lays out a 
consistent and interesting political philosophy, and one that remains true to the texts that 
Rawls wrote. 
The reconstruction that follows is organized around the ideas of justice and 
legitimacy. Justice is a familiar theme from Rawls’s work, yet the interpretation here 
assumes that the idea of legitimacy is at least as important to Rawls’s project. An 
emphasis on legitimacy is essential, I believe, for understanding the motivation behind 
many of Rawls’s arguments, as well as how these arguments are intended to support one 
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another. The importance of legitimacy to Rawls’s work has sometimes been suggested, 
but in my view it has not yet been sufficiently appreciated.20 
The reconstruction of Rawls’s work is divided into four sections, corresponding 
with the four main topics that this work addresses. These four topics are: legitimacy 
within a liberal society, justice within a liberal society, legitimacy within a decent (but 
non-liberal) people, and legitimacy among liberal and decent peoples. The reconstruction 
begins with what Rawls calls the first task of liberal political theory. 
 
I. LEGITIMACY WITHIN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 
The first task of liberal political theory is to find principles to order a 
constitutional regime so as to be both legitimate and stable.21 The exercise of political 
power in a liberal society is legitimate only when exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which are acceptable to all citizens, regarded as reasonable 
and rational.22 Citizens are reasonable when they are ready to propose and abide by fair 
terms of cooperation even at the expense of their own interests, given that others are also 
willing to do so.23 
The task of finding legitimate principles for a liberal society is made difficult by 
the fact of reasonable pluralism. This is the fact that citizens of modern democratic 
societies will hold irreconcilable but reasonable comprehensive doctrines — that is, 
irreconcilable but reasonable ideals of character and conceptions of what is valuable in 
human life.24 Because of reasonable pluralism, no comprehensive doctrine will be 
acceptable to all reasonable citizens. Therefore no comprehensive doctrine can be the 
basis for the legitimate exercise of political power in a liberal society.25  
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Reasonable pluralism also makes the problem of stability acute.26 A stable liberal 
regime must be freely supported by a substantial majority of its politically active 
citizens.27 Yet no liberal regime can maintain stability on the basis the principles of a 
comprehensive doctrine without the oppressive use of state power.28 
No comprehensive doctrine can provide the content for the principles of a 
legitimate and stable liberal constitution. What other source could there be for the content 
of these principles? There is only one source of fundamental ideas that could serve as a 
focal point for all reasonable citizens of a liberal society: the public political culture of 
that society.29 The public political culture comprises the political institutions of a society 
and the public traditions of their interpretation, as well as historic texts and documents 
that have become part of common knowledge.30 Reasonable citizens will understand that 
the public political culture of their society is the only source of ideas on which all can 
converge for the purpose of determining the basic terms of their cooperation.  
 The general solution to the problem of reasonable pluralism is thus to order a 
liberal constitution according to the principles of a political conception of justice. A 
political conception is a moral conception of justice for the basic structure whose 
principles are worked out from the fundamental ideas implicit in the public political 
culture of a liberal society.31 Since a political conception of justice stands free from all 
comprehensive doctrines, it is possible that the principles of a political conception will be 
acceptable to all reasonable citizens, and so possible that these principles can serve as the 
basis for legitimate coercion.32 And it is possible for such principles to order society 
stably, since they can be the focus of an overlapping consensus.33  
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In an overlapping consensus each reasonable citizen supports the political 
conception from within her own comprehensive view.34 Such a consensus is possible 
because reasonable citizens’ comprehensive doctrines are likely to be (or to become) 
compatible with the ideas in the public political culture from which the principles of the 
political conception are derived.35 
 Legitimacy thus requires that state power in a liberal society be exercised in 
accordance with the values of a political conception of justice. Yet state power is not the 
only political power that is exercised in a liberal society. Legitimacy imposes a moral 
duty of civility upon democratic citizens to appeal to the shared values of a political 
conception when they exercise political power over each other, and especially when they 
debate and decide upon constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.36 This is the 
duty of public reason. Citizens are to appeal to and decide in accordance with shared 
political values when they vote in elections, when they campaign for political office, and 
when they explain their decisions as government officials.37 
What then are the ideas in the public political culture of a liberal society that can 
be used to construct a political conception of justice? A fundamental idea in the public 
political culture adequate for working up a political conception of justice is the idea of 
society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens.38 There are many 
ways of specifying these ideas of fairness, freedom and equality. So there are many 
liberal political conceptions of justice.39 Any of these conceptions of justice, if 
implemented, would satisfy the liberal principle of legitimacy: that the exercise of 
coercive political power is fully legitimate only when this power is exercised in 
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accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably accept 
as free and equal.40 
Each member of the family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice 
will interpret differently the fundamental ideas of fairness, freedom and equality. 
However, there is a limit to the latitude with which these ideas from the public political 
culture may be interpreted. All reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice will 
meet three criteria of liberal legitimacy. They will: a) ascribe to all citizens the familiar 
liberal basic rights and liberties; b) assign these rights and liberties special priority with 
respect to claims of the general good and perfectionist values; and c) assure all citizens 
adequate means for taking advantage of these freedoms.41 These criteria require more 
specifically that there be publicly funded elections, universal basic health care, and a not 
excessively unequal distribution of wealth and income.42  
When citizens (including officials) exercise political power in accordance with the 
three criteria of liberal legitimacy, and within the bounds of public reason, they satisfy 
the demands of legitimacy and thus the criterion of reciprocity among citizens.43 A 
legitimate society’s stability is secured when its basic structure is effectively regulated by 
one of the family of reasonable political conceptions of justice (or a mix thereof), and 
when citizens who affirm some member of this family are in an enduring majority.44 
 
II. JUSTICE WITHIN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 
Justice as fairness is a political conception of justice based on one specific 
interpretation of the ideas of fairness, freedom and equality found in the public political 
culture of a liberal society.45 According to justice as fairness the freedom of citizens has 
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three aspects.46 Citizens are free in that they regard themselves as having a capacity to 
form, revise and pursue their conception of the good; in that they believe themselves to 
be self-authenticating sources of valid claims on institutions; and in that they are viewed 
as capable of taking responsibility for their ends given the resources likely available to 
them. Citizens are equal in virtue of possessing to a minimal degree the basic moral 
powers and the capacities that enable them to be fully cooperating members of society.47 
The specification of what citizens need — primary goods — is derived from this 
conception of the citizen.48 The conception of fairness used in justice as fairness 
emphasizes that social and natural facts about citizens that are arbitrary from a moral 
point of view should not be taken as basic when determining the distribution of primary 
goods.49 
The original position is a thought experiment meant to move from these 
conceptions of fairness, freedom, and equality to determinate principles of justice.50 In 
the original position, rational representatives of reasonable citizens choose principles of 
justice under conditions that are reasonable relative to the conceptions of citizen and 
society outlined.51 For example, the idea that society should be a fair system of 
cooperation among equals is modeled by the symmetric situation of the parties behind a 
veil of ignorance (that is, by their not knowing the particular circumstances of those they 
represent, so that they are unable to favor those they represent in their choices).52 Since 
the conceptions of citizen and society are modeled in the setup of the original position, 
the principles of justice that are selected within the original position should be the 
principles that are most congruent with these conceptions.53 
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Two principles would be selected in this original position: the first assuring equal 
basic rights and liberties, the second requiring fair equality of opportunity and that any 
inequalities of wealth and income be to the advantage of those worse off.54 These two 
principles are then to be further specified from the perspective of this original position 
into a fully determinate scheme of justice through a four-stage sequence.55 
Since justice as fairness meets the three criteria of liberal legitimacy it is a 
member of the family of reasonable political doctrines.56 Justice as fairness is typical of 
such liberal conceptions, although it is also the most egalitarian of them.57 Some may 
believe that justice as fairness is the most reasonable conception of justice, while others 
may reasonably prefer other members of the family of reasonable political doctrines.58 
 
III. LEGITIMACY WITHIN A DECENT PEOPLE 
The liberal principle of legitimacy specifies how coercive power may properly be 
used within a liberal society. A more general principle of legitimacy is needed to evaluate 
the use of coercive power in non-liberal societies. This general principle of legitimacy is: 
The exercise of coercive political power over persons is legitimate only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a basic structure that is acceptable to those persons, 
regarded as decent and rational.59 Persons are decent when they are ready to abide by the 
terms of a decent scheme of social cooperation even at the expense of their own interests, 
given that others are also willing to do so.60 
A society’s basic structure must meet four criteria in order to qualify as a decent 
scheme of social cooperation.61 First it must secure proper human rights, including rights 
to subsistence, security, personal property, and formal equality before the law, as well as 
   
10 
freedoms from slavery and some measure of liberty of conscience.62 Second, its legal 
system must be such as to impose bona fide moral duties and obligations on all persons 
subject to it on matters of law beyond those that concern human rights.63 A basic 
structure that satisfies these first two criteria realizes a common-good idea of justice, in 
that it takes into account what the society sees as the fundamental interests of all 
persons.64 Third, its officials must hold and publicly demonstrate a sincere and not 
unreasonable belief that the law they administer is guided by a common-good idea of 
justice.65 Fourth, it must give citizens a meaningful role in political discussions by 
providing opportunities for dissent, and by requiring government officials to take this 
dissent seriously and give it conscientious reply.66 
A non-aggressive society with a basic structure that meets these four criteria is a 
legitimate non-liberal society: a decent society.67 The institutions of a decent society may 
be inegalitarian, and they may be based on a comprehensive doctrine that is dominant in 
the local public political culture such as a religious view.68 Liberals will not see such a 
society’s laws as just, since these laws will not be based on the ideas of fairness, freedom, 
and equality.69 Yet since decent societies are non-aggressive and their institutions are 
legitimate, liberal societies have no justification for interfering in their affairs. To 
interfere in the affairs of a decent society would be intolerant.70  
An outlaw state is not a decent society: it is either aggressive toward other 
peoples, or its officials violate the human rights of those within their territory, or both.71 
Outlaw states need not be tolerated. Liberal societies may resist aggressive outlaw states 
in self-defense; and liberal societies may intervene in the affairs of outlaw states to stop 
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severe violations of human rights, since officials who violate human rights have no 
legitimate authority to exercise coercive political power in this way.72 
 
IV. LEGITIMACY AMONG WELL-ORDERED PEOPLES 
We require, finally, global principles to regulate relations among the members of 
the various liberal and decent peoples. Since these principles will be coercive, they must 
also pass a basic test of legitimacy. These principles must, that is, be acceptable to all 
persons regarded as rational and as either decent or reasonable. However, there is even 
more pluralism among individuals’ comprehensive doctrines globally than there is 
pluralism among individuals’ comprehensive doctrines within a liberal society.73 So, as 
above, given this pluralism no person’s comprehensive doctrine can provide the content 
of the principles that will be used to coerce all.74 We must instead again look to a public 
political culture as the focal source of fundamental ideas for the content of a political 
conception. This time, we must look to the global public political culture to find the 
content for a political conception of a law of peoples.75 
The global public political culture contains few ideas about how persons living in 
different societies should relate directly to one another.76 However, the global public 
political culture contains a wealth of ideas concerning how peoples ought to relate to one 
another. The principles governing relations among the members of liberal and decent 
societies must therefore be principles regulating conduct not among persons, but among 
peoples.77  
A people is a reasonable group of persons bound together by common sympathies 
and sharing a reasonably just or decent basic structure.78 Peoples are reasonable when 
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they are ready to propose and abide by fair terms of cooperation even at the expense of 
their own interests, given that other peoples are also willing to do so.79 Liberal peoples 
and decent peoples are together known as well-ordered peoples.80 The fundamental 
interests of well-ordered peoples include protecting their citizens, their territory, their 
political independence, and their self respect as peoples.81 Well-ordered peoples do not, 
however, have a fundamental interest in wealth above the level necessary to sustain their 
legitimate institutions; and for this reason there need be no (re-)distributive principle for 
wealth among peoples above the level necessary to sustain the legitimacy of each.82 
The fundamental idea in the global public political culture adequate for working 
up a political conception of a law of peoples is the idea that peoples ought to relate fairly 
to each other as free and equal. Peoples are free in that they conceive of themselves as 
politically independent and self-determining: that is, as capable of making their own 
decisions concerning their territories and their citizens’ well-being.83 Peoples are equal in 
that the fundamental interests of each are of the same importance as those of others.84 The 
idea of fairness in the global public political culture emphasizes that the size, power, and 
prosperity of different peoples should not be taken as basic when determining the terms 
of their cooperation.85 
The global original position is a thought experiment meant to move from these 
conceptions of fairness, freedom and equality to determinate principles of a law of 
peoples.86 This original position works by allowing rational representatives of reasonable 
peoples to choose principles for a law of peoples under conditions that are reasonable 
relative to the conception of peoples and their proper relations. Since the conceptions of 
peoples and their proper relations are modeled in the setup of this original position, the 
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principles of the law of peoples that are selected within it should be the principles that are 
most congruent with these conceptions.87  
The eight principles of the Law of Peoples would be selected in this original 
position.88 These principles state among other things that peoples should not instigate 
wars of conquest, should abide by their agreements, should honor human rights, and 
should assist those peoples that have fallen below the material conditions necessary to 
sustain legitimacy.89 The parties in the second original position would also select 
standards of fairness for trade, as well as guidelines to provide for cooperative 
organizations such as a world bank.90 The further interpretation of these principles and 
specification of these institutions is to be undertaken from the perspective of the global 
original position.91  
Finally, the basic requirement of legitimacy imposes a moral duty of civility on 
peoples to respect the bounds of global public reason. Members of peoples are to appeal 
to and decide in accordance with shared global political values when they vote in 
elections, when they campaign for public office, and when they explain their foreign 
policy decisions as government officials.92 When peoples and their members exercise 
political power in accordance with the eight principles of the Law of Peoples, and within 
the bounds of global public reason, they satisfy the demands of legitimacy and thus the 
criterion of reciprocity among peoples.93 The stability of the Society of Peoples is secured 
when relations among peoples are guided by the Law of Peoples, and when well-ordered 
peoples are capable of constraining any outlaw states that threaten the peace that obtains 
among them.94 
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This concludes the interpretation of Rawls’s work. Rawls’s theories of justice and 
legitimacy are not entirely finished, since they must still be extended outward to 
accommodate our relations to nature, and extended inward to explain our duties toward 
our fellow liberal citizens who cannot cooperate fully with us.95 But on the topics treated 
here, Rawls’s work is unified and complete.96 Rawls’s system may still face objections 
that one or another argument is unsound. Yet the charge of inconsistency is one criticism 
that Rawlsians can meet.97  
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